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as high inflation, clientelism, corruption and tax evasion are 
characteristics of states that occupy a more peripheral posi-
tion in the international division of labour. These states exhib-
it a high degree of internal structural heterogeneity in forms 
of production and class relations in which the distribution of 
the value of the social product is fiercely contested between 
different classes and class fractions.
Furthermore, neoliberal fiscal policies have repeatedly cre-
ated budget shortfalls, even before the current crisis. This is 
also the case for Germany. Due to the reduction in the top 
tax rate on high incomes and in the inheritance tax, the elimi-
nation of the wealth tax and the stock transfer tax, a tax ex-
emption on the sale of subsidiaries of joint stock companies, 
and other measures, reductions in tax receipts have come to 
be accepted. The capitalist state has developed into a «com-
petition state». Competing internationally for investment, it 
seeks to attract and bind businesses to locations within its ju-
risdiction, by means of selective reductions in taxes for firms 
and investors, as well as with subsidies. The wide mass of 
wage earners in contrast, had to endure increases in taxation 
and simultaneous reductions in social welfare benefits. The 
state has thus contributed to a redistribution of wealth from 
wage earners to the owners of capital.
Alongside the crisis of state indebtedness the banking cri-
sis has also returned. Since government bonds are an impor-
tant source of profits for banks and other owners of capital, 
the financial crisis also strikes back at financial institutions. 
Because state bankruptcies in Greece and elsewhere threat-
en European banks with collapse, financial houses hesitate 
to extend credit to one another. Already in 2007/08, as a re-
sult of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States, the so-called interbank loan market dried out. 
Banks now prefer to park their money with the European 
Central Bank (ECB) rather than to make it available to their 
peers. As in the autumn of 2008, this credit crunch also im-
pacts upon the circuit of industrial capital.
Uneven Development
The global dynamics of the crisis are superimposed on the 
contradictions of European integration, which in turn further 
intensify them. The unequal development of capital accumu-
lation in the Eurozone became starkly evident in the crisis. 
Germany and a few other countries achieved large current 
The crisis is not relinquishing its grip on Europe. From au-
tumn 2008 to early 2009 the world market experienced the 
deepest slump in economic output since the Second World 
War. This is a global crisis. Even in emerging economies like 
China, Brazil or India economic growth declined and could 
not compensate for the recession in the North Atlantic re-
gion. For the first time since the worldwide economic crisis 
of the 1930s global economic output has shrunk. After a brief 
uptick in 2010 which barely restored the level of reproduc-
tion prior to the crisis, in 2011 growth was again in world-
wide decline. In the last quarter of 2011 economic output 
in the EU shrunk by 0.3 percent. In the first months of 2012 
industrial production in the large EU nations of France, Italy 
and Spain contracted further.
From early 2010 the crisis in Europe has emerged as being 
one of state refinancing. In every crisis fiscal revenues take a 
hit while unemployment, and with it, social expenditures in-
crease. To this is added the gigantic bank rescue packages 
and – in comparison to these the admittedly less substantial – 
stimulus packages. All this has resulted in large increases in 
budget deficits and state debt. A number of countries, starting 
with Greece, have reached the limits of their borrowing capac-
ity. Because international investors have lost confidence that 
these countries can any longer service their debt, they are not 
able to obtain any new credit from the capital markets, or if so 
only at an intolerably high rate of interest. Some investors are 
also betting with credit default swaps on the bankruptcy of in-
dividual countries – a self-fulfilling prophecy.
the neoliberal «competition state»
Before the current crisis, and when considered separately 
from debt service, countries such a Spain, Italy and Ireland 
exhibited a positive primary balance in their public budgets. 
(see figure 1) That is to say, state revenues exceeded expen-
ditures. In these cases the particular problems regarding fi-
nances clearly developed only with the onset of the latest 
crisis. In other countries such as Greece and Portugal the 
primary balances of state budgets were indeed negative be-
fore the current crisis, which indicates structural problems 
with state financing. That the state, as for example in Greece, 
tolerated large-scale tax evasion must be understood as an 
element of a specific mode of capitalist development and a 




account surpluses and are simultaneously capital exporters 
(creditors). In contrast most Eurozone countries are capital 
importers (debtors) and have current account deficits. The 
balance of payments imbalances in Europe increased sub-
stantially in recent years. In the critical discussions taking 
place regarding this relationship several explanations are on 
offer.
First, increasing international indebtedness is linked to the 
hierarchical structures of the international division of labour 
and the uneven development of productive capacities. Ger-
many, for example, is equipped with a greatly diversified in-
dustrial structure, particularly in the production of means of 
production (machine tools, chemicals, etc.). Countries such 
as Greece in contrast have much less to offer to the world 
market. This unequal development has always been an im-
manent characteristic of the capitalist world economy. The 
further the productive force of labour progresses, that is, the 
more commodities that can be produced with the same de-
ployment of labour, the more the concentration and centrali-
sation of capital develops, and the more the tendential geo-
graphic concentration of production also takes place.
Secondly, uneven development is related to diverging 
unit labour costs. The relation between wages and produc-
tivity that is expressed in unit labour costs is crucial for the 
price competitiveness and profitability of capital. It should be 
noted that in no other EU country have unit labour costs in-
creased as little in the past ten years as in Germany. German 
companies have procured competitive advantages for them-
selves through wage restraint. The actuality of German ex-
port surpluses means of course that Germany must also play 
the part of international creditor in order to be able to sell its 
commodities abroad. Conversely, countries with current ac-
count deficits such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, France 
etc., must logically take on debt to be able to pay for their ex-
cess imports.
The third explanation for uneven development in the EU 
seems to contradict the second, and is based on the ob-
servation that rates of growth in the peripheral EU nations 
were previously higher than in Germany. The higher rates of 
growth and the capital imports of the peripheral nations are 
not indications of an absent competitiveness. On the con-
trary, from a Marxist perspective, capital flows as a rule to 
where profit rates are higher. It may indeed be the case that 
in the last decade unit labour costs increased much more in 
Greece than in Germany. But the question to pose is: based 
on what level? Wage levels in any case are much lower in 
Greece than in Germany.
The differing rates of growth are also correlated to the di-
verging real rates of interest in the Eurozone, which result 
from the difference in the nominal interest rate and the in-
flation rate. Through the ECB a uniform nominal base rate 
is prescribed, yet in light of different rates of price increases 
from country to country, this leads to divergent real interest 
rates. Because the rate of inflation is higher in Greece than in 
Germany, the corresponding real rates of interest are lower 
there. This being the case, it is thus attractive for investors to 
take on debt there. From this perspective the causality in the 
balance of payments is exactly the reverse of that in the first 
explanation: It is not the surplus commodity exports of Ger-
many that have led to the accumulation of debt in the periph-
ery, rather the export of capital from the imperialist centres 
has led to the higher rate of growth and the increase in com-
modity imports in the peripheral countries. In the first case 
the trade balance (current account) determines the capital 
account; in the second case this is reversed.
Does merchandise trade dominate over capital move-
ments, or vice versa, do capital flows dominate the trade in 
goods? In my view the question of causality in the balance of 
payments cannot be answered in general but only through 
more concrete analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Regardless of how one interprets the causality in the re-
lationship between commodity and capital flows, there is 
agreement that the problems in the Eurozone cannot be 
reduced to the financial crises of states. Not only has the in-
debtedness of the respective states in the Eurozone greatly 
increased, but so too has private debt. It would be mistak-
en in each case to comprehend the financial crisis of the 
state in isolation from developments in the economy as a 
whole.
intensifieD competition
The common currency is in any case intensifying competi-
tion and the problem of uneven development within the Eu-
rozone. Countries with slipping competitiveness in the Euro-
zone cannot use their own monetary policy, the devaluation 
of their own currency for example, to defend their competi-
tiveness. Pressure to adjust bears down above all on coun-
tries in the position of net debtors, that is, countries with a 
current account deficit and a capital import surplus. This 
pressure to adapt leads ultimately to wage reductions as is 
currently being implemented in an intensified form in Greece 
and Portugal by the austerity policies of the troika of the Eu-
ropean Commission, the ECB and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF).
The rigidity of the German government with regard to the 
management of the European crisis appears at first sight to 
contradict certain material interests of capital. It is not on-
ly Anglo-American investors who have long demanded that 
the ECB should purchase government bonds without limit in 
order to reduce interest rates for the EU countries affected 
by the refinancing crisis and restore confidence in their state 
securities. There has also been a demand in other European 
states for a more flexible position on the part of the ECB, and 
for the introduction of euro bonds. At the same time it is obvi-
ous that the brutal austerity policies that have been forced on 
Greece and other states in response to the economic turbu-
lence by the German government only push these countries 
even deeper into crisis. Hence it needs to be asked whether 















the prevailing crisis policies are themselves irrational from 
the perspective of the reproduction of capital.
The austerity measures and the demands for monetary 
state financing or the supranational socialization of debt ap-
pear at first to contradict each other. While austerity policies 
appear to have the reduction of state indebtedness as their 
aim, an expansion of the role of the ECB as lender of last re-
sort for the states of the Eurozone or a socialization of their 
debt by means of euro bonds would create the preconditions 
for an even greater expansion of state debt. However, there 
exists only a superficial contradiction between these meas-
ures. In the end, policies of cutbacks will also not lead to a 
reduction of state indebtedness, but at best will create the 
preconditions for the reestablishment of confidence for in-
vestors in European government bonds. Even the IMF ex-
pects that average indebtedness in the Eurozone, which in 
2010 was at 85.8 percent of GDP, will be at 86.6 percent in 
2016. Austerity policies, as well as the much-discussed so-
cialization of debt, serve to prevent an even greater devalu-
ation of fictitious capital, which is what government bonds 
embody. What is of concern here is not the reduction of state 
debt but rather its sustainability. As a sphere of investment, 
government debt, which has been growing faster globally in 
recent years than the global social product, is indispensable 
for global financial firms. 
intensification of exploitation
Yet, if austerity policies and the socialization of debt, and 
monetary state financing by the ECB, respectively, are just 
different ways to restore confidence in European govern-
ment bonds and guarantee a «sustainable» debt, why then 
are the governments of the Eurozone states not taking the 
more comfortable path and relaxing austerity measures and 
concentrating on the socialization of debt? Certainly, with-
out austerity policies state indebtedness would grow even 
quicker. But why would that be so problematic? Italy main-
tained levels of state indebtedness for decades in excess of 
100 percent of GDP. (see figure 2) Why did it suddenly be-
come a problem? Even the USA could afford a debt-to-GDP 
ratio of more than 100 percent, and Japan of even more than 
200 percent. What explains the rigidity of German and Euro-
pean austerity policies?
Their goal is not only to reduce state expenditures or to in-
crease tax revenue. It is also a matter of reducing wage lev-
els in the private sector and of increasing working hours, in 
short, of increasing the overall exploitation of labour. Auster-
ity policies don’t resolve the crisis but they help to realise tra-
ditional demands of capitalists that up to now had not been 
achievable due to the relation of forces. Austerity measures 
serve not only the bank rescues (which could also be carried 
out by the ECB buying out the banks’ government bonds), 
but serve above all industrial capital, in particular export-ori-
ented industrial capital, whose profitability can be increased 
in this way.
To add to this: It is not just about defending the euro but, 
above all, its international role. The common currency func-
tions not only as a means of circulation and payment with-
in the Eurozone, but also has a global function, even if as 
an international reserve currency it takes second place be-
hind the American dollar. The importance and prominence of 
the euro would be endangered if international investors lost 
confidence in the government bonds of Eurozone countries 
and withdrew their capital. The euro would hence lose value 
against the currencies of other capitalist centres. It is precise-
ly in the competition between currencies that the stability of 
the euro, as a measure of value, and as a means of circula-
tion and payment, as well as a medium of accumulation, is 
of importance. Internationally active banks and transnational 
corporations, which are based in the Eurozone, profit in par-
ticular when they can offer credit in their own currency and 











tries from the Eurozone, or the Eurozone’s bifurcation, will 
further gain in prominence.
In this situation the Left must mount a two-front struggle. 
One the one front, it must organise the defence of the work-
ing and popular classes against the ruling classes’ policies of 
immiseration, and fight against the fiscal pact which is lead-
ing to a further intensification of the neoliberal orientation of 
European financial and economic policies and a further hol-
lowing out of democracy. One the other, it must combat the 
nationalist, racist, and fascist forces opposing European inte-
gration. The Left must make clear that a different, democratic 
and solidaristic Europe is possible and necessary. 
Thomas Sablowski works at the Institute for Critical Social 
Analysis of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. He is also member 
of editorial board of the journal PROKLA and a member of the 
scientific advisory board of ATTAC Germany.
This article originally appeared in Junge Welt, May 5, 2012, also 
published in http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/635.php and  
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2012/sablowski160512.html 
Translation by Sam Putinja. 
when their business partners can pay in euros. This reduces 
their currency risks. 
In this regard it is of interest to these banks and corpo-
rations the extent to which actors outside of the Eurozone 
are prepared to use the euro as a currency. This becomes 
of even greater importance the more financial linkages with 
actors outside of the Eurozone increase. For Germany, ex-
ports to nations outside of the Eurozone in recent years in-
creased faster than exports to those within the Eurozone. 
The defence of the euro through policies of austerity is not 
simply the result of the European strategies of German capi-
tal but above all of its globalisation strategies. Nevertheless, 
the German government does not the play the role of Eu-
rope’s disciplinarian solely in the interests of German capital 
but also in the interests of dominant fractions of capital in 
other Eurozone countries. Only this convergence of interests 
can explain why Sarkozy largely swung into line behind Mer-
kel and why the Greek governments under no circumstances 
considered exiting the Eurozone although austerity policies 
were and are wrecking the internal market, and are damag-
ing the fraction of capital dependent on this market. 
resistance
In the coming months several countries must refinance huge 
portions of their state debts that are coming due. That is, they 
must replace them with new loans. It remains to be seen 
to what extent this will be possible with sustainable inter-
est rates. Currently under discussion is whether the «rescue 
packages» which have covered the EU countries with the 
temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
more permanently with the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) are sufficient, if the refinancing of larger countries like 
Italy and Spain through capital markets will no longer be pos-
sible. A further expansion of the mutual liability for the public 
debt of individual nations will confront yet greater political 
resistance than we have until now experienced. When this 
happens the forces demanding the exit of individual coun-
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